Real-time simulations to evaluate the RPAS integration in shared airspace by Pastor Llorens, Enric et al.
Fourth SESAR Innovation Days, 25th – 27th November 2014
 
Real-time Simulations to Evaluate the RPAS
Integration in Shared Airspace
E. Pastor, M. Perez-Batlle, P. Royo, R. Cuadrado and C. Barrado
ICARUS Research Group
Technical University of Catalonia
Esteve Terrades, 5. 08860 Castelldefels - Catalonia (Spain)
Abstract—This paper presents the work done during the first
year in the WP-E project ERAINT (Evaluation of the RPAS-
ATM Interaction in Non-Segregated Airspace) that intends to
evaluate by means of human-in-the-loop real-time simulations
the interaction between a Remotely Piloted Aircraft System
(RPAS) and the Air Traffic Management (ATM) when a Remotely
Piloted Aircraft (RPA) is being operated in shared airspace. This
interaction will be evaluated from three different perspectives.
First, the separation management, its results are presented in
this paper. Secondly, during the next year, the contingency
management, also including loss of link situations and, lastly, the
capacity impact of such operations in the overall ATM system.
The used simulation infrastructure allows to simulate realistic
exercises from both the RPAS Pilot-in-Command (PiC) and the
Air Traffic Controller (ATCo) perspectives. Moreover, it permits
to analyze the actual workload of the ATC and to evaluate several
support tools and different RPAS levels of automation from the
PiC and ATC sides. The simulation results and the usefulness
of the support tools are presented for each selected concept of
operations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Technology evolution in the field of Remotely Piloted Air-
craft Systems (RPAS), will affect the Air Traffic Management
(ATM) performance regarding to their upcoming military and
civil applications. RPAS, as new airspace users, present new
challenges and opportunities to the ATM system of the future.
The goal of this upcoming ATM is to improve the network in
terms of capacity, efficiency, safety and security. However, the
integration of RPAS poses a risk due to their inherent nature.
At present the majority of flights correspond to manned
commercial aviation dealing with persons/goods point to point
transportation. On the contrary, the majority of future RPAS
flights may significantly differ from this paradigm. Most
common RPAS mission will be surveillance, requiring flexible
and uncertain flight plans executed by computers with the
remote supervision by the RPAS pilot. It is true that nowadays
there exists some general aviation manned aircraft performing
this type of missions, but their operation is a minority and
it’s always a man-directed process with little direct control
from computers. Point to point ferry flights by RPAS are also
foreseen at some point in the future. The introduction of RPAS
may exponentially increase this type of operations, placing a
larger pressure into the ATM system.
Under Eurocontrol’s and Federal Aviation Authority’s
(FAA) philosophy, the introduction of unmanned traffic should
not affect ATM operations, thus RPAS should comply with the
performance levels required by SESAR or NextGen. Hence,
RPAS operation should be shaped to large extends to guarantee
its safe and efficient interaction with the ATM system.
In aviation, several layered mechanisms are present to
minimize the probability of collision between aircraft. Gen-
erally speaking, they are categorized into two main groups:
separation assurance and collision avoidance [1]. Separation
assurance aims at keeping minimum distances between the air-
craft and potential intruders. A loss of separation is considered
a serious issue and ideally, it should never occur. Nevertheless,
collision avoidance functionality should prevent an imminent
collision as a last resort maneuver.
While extensive research is being devoted to develop colli-
sion avoidance systems (see [2] for a review on this topic) that
take into account the particularities of RPAS (the detect-and-
avoid paradigm), few researchers have addressed the separa-
tion, emergency and lost-link problem for RPAS. Furthermore,
at present, no assessment or methodology exists that deals with
the necessity to coordinate RPAS almost automatic operations,
but monitored by pilots, with all other ATM actors under
nominal and emergency operations.
The WP-E project ERAINT focus on these additional as-
pects of the RPAS-ATM interaction that has not been previ-
ously addressed, which will determine the feasibility and effec-
tiveness of the RPAS integration. This project is investigating
such relationships in a systematic way, developing a concept
of operation for both the RPAS and the Air Traffic Controller
(ATCo) that may control them. The RPAS Concept of Opera-
tions (ConOps) and all the automation supporting systems will
be put under test within a number of evaluation mechanisms:
from a real-time simulation environment in which both the
pilot and ATCo responses can be evaluated in detail; to fast
time simulation models in which the statistical behavior can
be studied.
This paper summarizes the work (from the validation pro-
cess to the simulation trials and results) that has been done
during the first year of this project. Its reminder is organized as
follows: Section II presents the ERAINT project scope, paying
particular attention to the main aims of the projects and its
organization. Section III details the objectives pursued within
the first year. Section IV and Section V define the simulation
exercises that have been performed and present the derived
results, respectively. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper
and outlines some future work.
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II. ERAINT PROJECT SCOPE
On top of the existing regulatory framework, civil RPAS
integration in non-segregated IFR airspace will only be permit-
ted once they comply with the performance levels required by
SESAR [3]. Most of the technological and procedural existing
gaps have been identified in the Annex 2 of the Roadmap for
the integration of civil Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Systems into
the European Aviation System [4], recently published by the
European Commission.
The goal of this work is to provide an environment that
permits the analysis of specific areas (identified as gaps in that
Roadmap) related to the insertion of RPAS in non-segregated
airspace and the impact of their automated/autonomous remote
operation. The research specifically addresses aspects of the
separation provision, response to RPAS contingencies, lost
link procedures, RPAS-ATC interaction and the impact on the
controller’s workload and airspace capacity due to the RPAS
insertion (mainly gaps EC-1.1, EC-1.2, EC-3.1, EC-3.2, EC-
5.1, EC-5.3 and EC-6.1).
ERAINT specifically addresses separation provision, re-
sponse to RPAS contingencies, lost link procedures, RPAS-
ATC interaction and the impact on the airspace capacity due
to the RPAS insertion. Also, combined with the introduction
of additional automation technology, the research seeks to
investigate the active interaction of the Pilot-in-Command
(PiC, the legal responsible of the flight) and the ATC through
the extensive use of automation and information exchange.
We intend to find how automation (i.e. systems that support
the RPAS pilot while he keeps the final decision) may help
the RPAS to satisfy the operational and safety requirements;
and how information can be shared between the RPAS and
ATC in a proactive way through upcoming data-links or even
the System Wide Information Management (SWIM) initiative,
improving both the ATC and RPAS situational awareness.
The elements under investigation are addressed in three
steps, namely:
• Step A: En-route automatic separation management with
open and closed instructions by the ATC and proactive
participation of the RPAS through strategic trajectory
negotiation.
• Step B: Contingency management with automatic or even
autonomous operation by the RPAS (in case of lost-
link) with active intentions interchange and negotiation
between the RPAS and the ATC.
• Step C: Strategies to access non-segregated controlled
airspace limiting the negative impact of the RPAS oper-
ation to airspace capacity and ATC workload.
The objective of the project is to validate a number of
technological and operational enablers and contribute to the
RPAS Roadmap. Enablers will focus on the exploitation of
specific RPAS procedures as well as ADS-C / ADS-B [5]
and data link technology to increase the situational awareness
around the RPAS-ATC interaction, and therefore reduce the
negative impact of RPAS insertion in non-segregated airspace.
In the first year Step A has been fully addressed and
delivered. This paper will summarize what has been done,
paying particular attention to the simulation trials and results.
III. STEP A: SEPARATION MANAGEMENT
A. Context of validation
Nowadays, separation in controlled airspace is typically re-
sponsibility of the ATCo, which issue clearances to the aircraft
in order to maintain, at least, certain minimum separation
values. Some systems, however, have already been proposed
to increase the automation levels of these manual separation
provision processes (i.e. specific tools that support the ATCo
to manage the desired separation levels). For example, as an
ATCo support tool, the Medium Term Collision Detection
(MTCD) system computes initially the trajectory of the aircraft
using the flight plan, performance parameters and meteorolog-
ical information and then, refines it by monitoring the actual
performance of the aircraft [6]. Similar concepts are brought at
cockpit level with the Airborne Separation Assurance Systems
(ASAS) [7], which aim to delegate separation tasks from
controllers to pilots. Furthermore, SESAR and NextGen pro-
grams propose new paradigms that rely on accurate design and
execution of four-dimensional trajectories that are expected to
transition from radar control to trajectory-based operations [8].
Among all RPAS possible applications, surveillance mis-
sions will be perhaps the most numerous [9]. In these missions,
RPAS will not operate as current commercial aircraft, which
fly point-to-point missions. They will possibly loiter over
certain areas performing all kinds of non-conventional flight
plans (such as scans, perimeter loops, etc.) that will change
dynamically during the flight, according to the mission needs.
Moreover, most of the RPAS will have poorer flight perfor-
mance than commercial airliners (in terms of cruise speed
and climb/descent performance, for instance), but will likely
operate at very similar altitudes. Therefore, the separation
provision can become an issue in a real RPAS implementation.
This validation focuses on separation manoeuvres for RPAS
and analyses the case where a RPAS needs separation from a
much faster airplane flying at the same altitude. We evaluate
a number of conflict scenarios between typical HALE and
MALE RPAS (a Northrop Grumman RQ-4A Global Hawk and
a General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper) and jet airliners present in
the European airspace. Different requirements will be analysed
in terms of equipment and roles for the ATC and RPAS
pilot. Since today’s standard separation strategies may have
a negative impact on the RPAS mission, implying a deviation
from the desired surveillance track, this validation will also
evaluate pre-planned RPAS separation manoeuvres. They aim
to improve the situational awareness of both ATC and RPAS
PiC, but also to disrupt as less as possible the sequence
of the mission performed by the RPAS. Strategic trajectory
modifications will be proactively suggested by the RPAS pilot
in order to minimize potential separation issues.
Two different missions have been designed to address this
validation. A point to point mission for the RQ-4A vehicle,
with a small number of alternative routes according to the
desired level of transit to be encountered. A surveillance
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mission for the MQ-9 platform, with certain level of dynamic
trajectory variations that try to reproduce a realistic operational
scenario.
B. Validation overview
Step A of the validation has been organized around a single
planned validation experiment in which a constant traffic
configuration is kept, while the capabilities of both the RPAS
and the ATC evolve.
The RPAS operated in a mixed-mode simulator environment
called ISIS+, in which coarse-level simulated IFR traffic
(provided by eDEP simulator) was mixed up with a fine-level
simulated RPAS (provided by ISIS); that was managed by
simulated ATC centres. The flight trial scenarios use realistic
sectorization with various levels of traffic density and the
RPAS operating within those sectors.
To guarantee the success of the validation, the preparation
of the exercises has employed fast-time analysis tools (NEST
and eDEP) that should evaluate the workload levels produced
by the planned traffic scenarios to, first, pre-analyze workload
levels in all traffic samples and their randomized versions and,
second, to compute actual workload levels of all exercises once
completed.
At all times the RPAS will operate under strict non-
segregation, although it is clearly recognized that different
situations need to be addressed, depending on the RPAS being
enroute to/from the mission area; and the mission area itself.
The evolution of the capabilities of both RPAS and the ATC
through the planned validation experiment is the following:
• Base Level Scenario 1. No RPAS Operating: This sam-
ple is the baseline (nominal) scenario. It is kept free from
RPAS operating in the area of interest. This scenario,
originating from a busy live traffic sample extracted from
the DDR2 database [10], contains the traffic operating in
the intended mission area of the RPAS mission. Traffic
complexity is made variable over the time period under
analysis. No meteorological effects will be included. The
scenario will be used as a baseline to compare the results
of the scenarios with RPAS flights.
• Scenario 2. No flight-intent RPAS: This sample features
the exact same traffic than the baseline scenario 1, with
one RPAS operating (either a RQ-4A or a MQ-9) over
a certain mission area. The RPAS will be assumed
to operate without flight-intent or data-link capabilities.
Only transponder and ADS-B data will be made available
to the ATC. The RPAS will be passive, only requesting
mission-related clearances through voice communications
and relying on separation as managed by the ATC.
• Scenario 3. Pro-active, no data-link, flight intent
RPAS: This sample features the exact same traffic than
scenario 1, with one RPAS operating (either a RQ-4A or a
MQ-9) over a certain mission area. On top ADS data, the
RPAS will be assumed to operate flight-intent capabili-
ties; that is, being able to provide detailed intentions. The
RPAS will act pro-actively, requesting multiple mission
clearances through voice communications.
TABLE I
SUPPORTED SURVEILLANCE AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES.
Scenario ID Surveillance systems Communications
Scenario 1 PSR / SSR RTF
Scenario 2 PSR / SSR RTF
Scenario 3 PSR / SSR / ADS-C RTF / Limited datalink
IV. SIMULATION EXERCISES DEFINITION
A. Expected benefits/outcomes
The ERAINT simulation exercises have been all executed
in the ISIS simulation infrastructure [11]. A limited number
of ATC and pseudo pilot were integrated. The following list
summarizes the performance expectations from the exercises
per relevant stakeholders:
• Controllers: (1) Asses the viability of the RPAS integra-
tion and the specific separation strategies to be used to
negative minimize traffic impact. (2) Asses which data
link messages are necessary and sufficient to meet the
needs of the concept. (3) Asses that no negative impact
on operations is derived from the use of new CWP/HMI.
• Research: (1) Validate the relevance of the RPAS-ATC
simulation environment. (2) Understand up to which level
the RPAS can be a pro-active vehicle. (3) Validate that
RPAS missions can be carried out when operating in
shared airspace. (4) Validate which types of separation
manoeuvres are best suited for RPAS.
• SJU: (1) Obtain assurance that the RPAS integration
concepts under consideration are feasible.
B. Benefit mechanisms investigated
Figure 1 outlines the expected impacts of the RPAS insertion
in shared airspace once the operational and technological
elements envisaged by ERAINT are in place.
The strategic planning is impacted (Ref. (1)). Three indica-
tors have been used to analyse this impact. The Coordination
Controller (CC) workload is expected to increase since he may
need to plan the RPAS trajectories in order to avoid tactical
conflicts due to their limited manoeuvrability. The sector
throughput is expected to keep almost the same throughput
levels due to the limited number of RPAS operating in the
sector, the flexibility offered by the RPAS to deviate from its
planned trajectory as required by the CC and the increase in
situational awareness about the RPAS intentions. Finally, the
number of strategic manoeuvres is expected to increase since
it is the main separation mechanism to be employed, trying to
minimize tactical ones.
The tactical planning is impacted (Ref. (2)). Three indicators
have been used to analyse this impact. The complexity of each
tactical conflict will increase due to the RPAS limitations to
manoeuvre and the conflict dissimilarity between RPAS and
airliners. The number of tactical manoeuvres is expected to
globally be maintained because most of the RPAS conflicts
will be addressed strategically. Finally, the EC workload is
expected to slightly increase because the number of RPAS
induced conflicts may decrease but the individual complexity,
given the RPAS limitations to manoeuvre, may increase.
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Figure 1. Benefit and impact mechanisms.
The way flight intent is interchanged is impacted (Ref.
(3)). A single indicator has been used to analyse this impact.
More detailed RPAS intent information will be interchanged
and additional alternative intent will be interchanged once
the RPAS required modifying its actual trajectory in order to
comply with its mission requirements.
The way separation manoeuvres are performed is impacted
(Ref. (4)). A single indicator has been used to analyse this im-
pact. RPAS require different types of separation manoeuvres,
both at strategic and tactical levels due to their performance
limitations and dissimilarity, but also due to their inherent
surveillance objectives.
The type and quantity of data-link interactions is impacted
(Ref. (5)). A single indicator has been used to analyse this
impact: Increased levels of data-link interactions are expected
between RPAS and ATC in order to benefit the ATC situational
awareness and to achieve the mission flexibility required by
the RPAS to satisfy its mission objectives.
C. Choice of metrics and indicators
Table II introduces the metrics and indicators related to the
different activities.
D. Exercise preparation
As we have stated in Section III, two different missions have
been designed. A surveillance mission being performed by the
MQ-9 Reaper and a ferry mission, which has been performed
by the RQ-4A Global Hawk. Both of them will be described
from the airspace and traffic configuration point of view.
• Surveillance mission: A slightly modified airspace con-
figuration has been designed in order to better suit the
simulated traffic flows. The Barcelona FIR airspace has
been divided in six sectors. A single sector has been
created for the FIR airspace below FL150. The upper part
has been divided into five areas. The northern half of the
FIR has been partitioned into three sectors: LECBNW2,
LECBNW1 and LECBNE. The first one manages all the
northern arrivals two the main Balearic airports while
the others manage main departure procedures. The upper
southern half of the FIR is divided in two sectors, both of
them managing departure and arrival procedures. Figure
2 shows a view of the implied sectors with the base
RPAS trajectory as seen in the NEST analysis tool.
The simulated traffic comprises all aircraft crossing the
selected airspace during the RPAS mission time span.
• Ferry mission: For this specific mission, the RPAS flight
plan crosses three different FIRs: LECB (Barcelona).
LFMM (Marseille), LIRR (Rome). In order to main-
tain the consistency between both scenarios, the LECB
airspace configuration used in the surveillance mission
has been maintained. The en-route flight stage mainly
occurs in LECB and LFMM and, therefore, the chosen
sectors to simulate belong to this FIR. In order to maxi-
mize the number of hand-offs and coordination between
both controllers and two maximize the time the RPAS
is in an active sector the chosen sectors are LECBNE
from Barcelona FIR and LFMMDD from Marseille FIR.
Figure 3 shows a view of the implied sectors with the base
RPAS trajectory as seen in the NEST analysis tool. As in
the surveillance mission, the simulated traffic comprises
all aircraft crossing the selected airspace during the RPAS
mission time span.
V. SIMULATION EXERCISES RESULTS
This section summarizes the main results achieved during
simulations, emphasizing both the RPAS and the ATC per-
spective. A list of recommendations to improve the analysis
is also included for each one of the topics being analyzed.
A. Taskload and workload extracts
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show some of the CAPAN taskload
[12] and ISA workload results captured for the MQ-9 sim-
ulations executed. The workload diagrams show the same
type of structure. The vertical bars represent discrete values
corresponding to the ISA input generated by the ATC at the
time it was requested for a sample, which could be (VeryLow,
Low, Fair, High, VeryHigh or NoData). The value NoData is
recorded if the ATC does not respond in the proper time-
frame. The time from the instant the ISA system queries
the ATC, to the time he actually responds is shown in the
continuous red line with samples centred in the ISA vars. The
samples represent the time, in seconds, required by the ATC
to respond. 30 seconds correspond to the upper bound the
ATC has available to respond, thus all NoData samples have
that time value. It will be easily observed that the higher the
workload, the higher the time required by the ATC to respond.
Similarly, all taskload diagrams show the same structure.
The blue line corresponds to the Number of Aircraft in the
4
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TABLE II
METRICS AND INDICATORS AVAILABLE FOR STEP A.
Activity Pre Simulation During Scenario Post Scenario Post Simulation
Separation Scenario Brief
Observer checklist
(errors / discrepancies) Scenario Debrief
ISA CAPAN Day debrief
STCA taskload User acceptance
ADS-B Recording Workload scale
RPAS Recording
Baseline Scenario Brief
Observer checklist
(errors / discrepancies) Scenario Debrief
ISA CAPAN taskload
STCA Workload scale
ADS-B Recording
Figure 2. LECBNW2 and LECBNE sectors as seen in eDEP during the MQ-9 nomital trajectory.
sector, accounted at the exact instant of time that any aircraft
enters or exits the sector. The yellow line corresponds to the %
of time that the ATC controller is busy, as the result of adding
up all the time effort for recorded events in a 30 minutes
window. Taskload values are updated in the diagram at a rate
of 1 minute. The taskload diagrams may also show separation
events and STCA events.
• The separation events correspond to aircraft that get in the
so-called 20 NM separation horizon (i.e. they get closer
than 20 NM and at less than 1000 ft in vertical separation
to other vehicles).
• STCA events correspond to aircraft which trajectory will
put them in a collision course with a closest point less
than the separation target, which has been set tp 3 NM
in the horizontal plane and at that less than 1000 ft in
vertical separation from other aircraft.
It is worth mentioning that, in some cases, the duration
of the conflict may be less than 1 minute, thus leading to
consecutive samples that have the same value; even the zero
value, as a conflict is detected and cleared in just a few
seconds. Periods of time in which the RPAS was operating
within the sector are indicated in semi-transparent grey areas.
Note that in some cases the RPAS exits and re-enters the
area . Table III summarizes both the taskload and workload
results shown in the diagrams in the next subsections. For each
simulation run the following elements are provided:
• Time Sector: refers to the total time in minutes during
which the RPAS was operating within the sector under
analysis. Baseline simulations do not show this value for
obvious reasons.
• Conf RP and Conf AIL: refers to the separation conflicts
between RPAS and airliners or only between airliners.
• Av CAP and Max CAP: refers to the average CAPAN
taskload values during the period of analysis, and the
maximum CAPAN factor observed (always as a % of
available time).
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Figure 3. LECBNE and LFMMDD sectors as seen in eDEP during the RQ-4 nominal trajectory.
• Av ISA, Act ISA and Sil ISA: Average value of the ISA
sample during the period under analysis (1-Very Low
up to 5-Very High), number of total ISA samples, and
number of sample cycles in which the controller did not
respond within its assigned time-window.
RQ-4A taskload shows that the selected scenario does not
include significant traffic. CAPAN levels are fairly low and the
practical experience during simulation indicated that no major
conflicts existed during that ferry operation. Thus, the RQ-4A
ferry mission was partially disregarded and a major focus was
placed on the MQ-9 mission.
The MQ-9 mission showed much more potential for sep-
aration conflicts. The analysis of the data shows a certain
tendency in an increase of the CAPAN values (due to the
additional RPAS activity), and also an increase in ISA samples,
although no clear tendency can be concluded. Those variations
are explained due to the rotation of the ATC controllers.
Additional samples are required in order to extract better
conclusions.
B. Mission, traffic overview and ATC procedures
From the RPAS perspective both the RQ-4A and MQ-9
missions have been created to a satisfactory level of realism.
When designing further missions, it is considered that the
selected design strategy keeps being valid. Departure and
arrival procedures are properly executed and flight profiles are
reasonably realistic.
The level of realism will be increased by improving the
performance of the selected aircraft. Further steps will incorpo-
rate improved versions of both aircraft. Realistic performance
data has been employed in order to improve the behaviour of
the RQ-4A (MQ-9 will be in a near future). Once the RPAS
models have been consolidated, a full performance analysis of
both vehicles should be implemented to generate data that can
be employed in a flight prediction tool; and to provide key
performance figures to the ATC controllers.
From an operational point of view, difficulties have been
encountered to establish a proper RPAS-ATC communication
to request flight plan variations related to surveillance opera-
tions. Two different problems were identified when trying to
define a proper dialog:
• How to specify the area of operations? ATC screens
do not have proper tools to specify temporary mission
areas, so controllers needed simple references, specified
as a position and a radius around it. The natural process
of specified the centre of the operation and the radios
of the operation was not possible, as there was no way
to communicate those items. Hence, in the end, the
mission areas were larger than necessary, as the RPAS
pilot needed to request clearances well in advance.
• How to communicate that a mission operation was
requested? An agreement was reached about how the
RPAS pilot should request a mission area by using
the radio channel (no data-link was available for that
process). The RPAS request should read something like
“[callsign] request mission area of radius XX”.
The surveillance altitude is assumed to be the same than the
RPAS was cleared at that very same instant of time. Only in
case the request was granted, a new altitude may be requested
by the RPAS following standard procedures.
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Figure 4. ISA / CAPAN load for exercise 20-03-2014-S1-ATC4 (LECBNE LELC-LELC).
Figure 5. ISA / CAPAN load for exercise 20-03-2014-S1-ATC1 (LECBNW2 LELC-LELC).
An additional agreement was associated to any surveillance
operation: before performing each one of the turns, that RPAS
should notify the ATC to reconfirm the clearance to turn. Note
that this agreement was implemented regardless the availability
of flight intent information.
Temporary segregation like the ones explored in this re-
search are intended to be porous to various level of density;
that is, to allow traffic to cross the mission area under the
ATC’s criteria. As it can be seen either in figures 2 or 3, traffic
can easily cross RPAS mission areas, although an obvious
efficiency impact exists.
C. Representation and complexity of the scenarios
From the ATC point of view, the different types of exercises
designed allowed to simulate different workloads. The type
of traffic and the density could be adjusted in every exercise
so that both the pilots and the ATCs could get used to the
environment.
Regarding the traffic workload, it reflects a standard demand
for an ordinary summer day. The arrival and departing traffic
flows are complementary as can be suspected from a typical
HUB operation. When the arrival flow of traffic is very dense,
the departures are not, and vice versa. In the simulation, we
have the same effect, when there were many arrivals to the
Balearic Islands, there were not as many departures. In that
case, sector LECBNE is under a light workload.
The simulated scenarios don’t represent an excessive com-
plexity regarding the managing of air traffic. The RPAS in-
corporation in the simulation lightly increased the complexity
to the controller, due to the fact that its flight plan was well
7
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TABLE III
TASKLOAD/WORKLOAD REVIEW FOR EACH MQ9 SIMULATION EXECUTION FOR EXERCISE.
defined within clear boundaries. On the other hand, the RPAS
increased the controller’s workload. As a matter of fact, the
number of ATC instructions was increased, and above all, the
workload regarding the tactic planning required to prepare
the descending traffic authorizations, was highly increased.
Another aspect worth of mention, is the fact that the RPAS
presence affects the efficiency of the civil aircraft operations.
As an example: in many cases, the optimum descent for the
airliners is not allowed when separation has to be provided
with the RPAS.
From the RPAS PiC point of view, the levels of completion
of both RPAS missions have been extremely high. The RQ-
4A ferry mission has not encountered any interference. The
MQ-9 surveillance mission has been also executed without
almost restrictions from the ATC point of view. In fact, the
level of interference is considered to be low, as almost all
course changes and flight level variations were authorized.
Finally, indicate that the extension of the simulation period
is considered too short to be able to reproduce the impact of
extreme long duration RPAS missions. Strategies need to be
identified in order to extend the duration of the operations.
D. Environment, tools, particular situations, etc
From the ATC point of view, eDEP is compliant with a real
system. Some specific issues that can affect the simulation
results such as the eDEP available tools, which differ from
then ones used by the ATC in their work environment or
the difference between the behavior of the pseudo-pilots and
real aircraft pilots (in terms of phraseology, authorization
negotiations, etc.) should be considered.
The conflict detection screen was sometimes useful in order
to warn the controller of a possible conflict. In some occasions
the alert was not real. Regarding the tool used by the ATCs in
order to calculate the minimum distance in which two aircraft
will cross each other, we considered it could be enhanced.
From the RPAS operator point of view, the simulation sys-
tem performed satisfactory. All simulations behaved properly,
and the link with surrounding tools, like eDEP and the ISA
data logging subsystem also performed well.
A number of small improvements were detected such as
the need to provide tools to identify the mission area, or to
improve the way flight plans and intent is communicated via
data-link to the ATC. Some of them were introduced during
the simulation development, while others should be necessary
to implement before starting further activities.
E. Intent design and use by the RPAS
During the simulations, the following information regarding
the RPASs route was available under eDEP:
• RPAS presented and approved flight plan, with informa-
tion regarding departure airport, arrival airport, route to
the working area and a initial version of the planed work.
• Mission related intentions: RPAS operator, while flying,
may transmit new information about the mission to the
ATC via voice or data link. These new intentions will not
be flown until the clearance is granted by the ATC.
• Cleared intentions: once the RPAS has received the ATC
clearance, it can load the updated mission in the RPASs
FMS and fly it. If the pilot wants to change the mission
again, he should ask for clearance again.
In the first scenario used, only the initial flight plan was
available, and the mission updating was not reflected in
eDEP. The pilot transmitted via radio the intentions and, after
receiving the clearance, started to fly the new route. The
radio overload was high, and this solution is not considered
appropriate in case of high-medium workload. Due to the fact
that the controller didnt have the updated intention of the
RPAS in the eDEP environment, ATC’s blocked all the RPAS’s
used airspace area to the surrounding commercial flights.
In the second scenario, the pilot transmitted the intentions
via radio, and after receiving the ATC clearance, introduced
them in the FMS and flew them. In this case, the FMS loaded
route was received in eDEP and was shown to the ATC. This
allowed an operational improvement due to the fact that the
separations between the RPAS and commercial traffic could
be trimmed knowing where the RPAS was at all times.
In the third scenario, intentions could be visualized in eDEP
before being cleared by ATC. This functionality allows a
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Figure 6. RPAS flight plan versus its immediate intend when performing unplanned surveillance.
significant reduction in communications when asking for a
clearance for the mission. On top of this, the controller was
able to visualize the loaded route in the RPAS’s FMS. As in
the second scenario, this functionality allows a more efficient
use of the airspace.
RPAS flight intent has shown itself as a highly valuable
mechanism to facilitate the integration of RPAS in non-
segregated airspace. During the ferry RQ-4A mission, flight
intent reconfirmed an uneventful operation, without any sep-
aration issue and limited amount of impact with surrounding
aircrafts. During the MQ-9 surveillance mission the benefits
were much higher, especially in those periods of time in which
the RPAS needed to divert its initial flight plan to perform
scan-area or scan-point operations. Flight intent permitted
the RPAS a more clear communication of its intentions,
thus letting the ATC controller to provide a higher level of
porosity of the temporary restricted area. Given that porosity,
other traffic could cross the surveillance area (at different
flight levels). Once better experience and tuning of the intent
mechanism is in place, it is expected that the negative impact
of the RPAS operation can be further minimized.
Even though flight intent provides clear indications that it
is the way to go in terms of RPAS integration, a number of
elements need to be evaluated and consolidated before further
evaluations can be performed.
First, clarify the full concept of operation behind the usage
of flight intent. In particular a clear differentiation is necessary
to understand the role of the filled flight plan, and how
flight intent is a valid mechanism to negotiate flight plan
modifications, both permanent and temporary; but also to keep
track of the RPAS trajectory while a temporary flight plan
change is being executed.
Second, identify how each type of flight intent should be
implemented in order to maximize the benefit to the ATC.
In particular there is a large difference between immediate
flight intent information and flight intent designed to negotiate
trajectory changes (see Figure 6 to see flight intents with
different levels of detail and extension in time). Immediate
flight intent should be provided to cover a short time horizon
(5-10 minutes maximum), avoiding cluttering the ATC screen
with too much detail. Figure 6 (top part) shows an example of
that type of flight intent. Given the low speed of most RPAS
vehicles, the selected 5-10 min time window will mostly cover
one or two trajectory changes (as seen in the image).
Flight intent designed for trajectory negotiation may need
to cover wider portions of the flight operation, so that the ATC
can properly understand the mid- and long-term implications
of the trajectory change. Figure 6 (bottom part) depicts an
example of such type of intent. In the image the full scan area
operation is visualized, together with flight time estimations.
The ATC may use that information to take a strategic decision
with solid intent data that covers potential interactions with
multiple aircrafts covering that surveillance area.
VI. CONCLUSION
The RPAS integration into shared airspace is a challenge
from several perspectives. On one hand, providing continual
separation between all aircraft is a critical requirement for
the integration. On the other hand, more particular aspects of
RPAS such as common contingency or lost-link management
have to be addressed. ERAINT project is tackling these issues.
Initially, the RPAS-ATM relationship in terms of separation
management has been addressed by means of several real-time
simulations using different available surveillance and commu-
nication technologies. As a result of the simulations a number
of conclusions can be extracted. First, mission traffic and
ATC procedures are realistic enough, both from the ATC and
RPAS perspectives. Second, regarding the complexity of the
scenarios, it reflected a standard demand that did not represent
an excessive complexity. Finally, the simulation environment
9
  
 
Fourth SESAR Innovation Days, 25th – 27th November 2014 
 
 
and the used tools are also realistic and useful, in particular the
RPAS flight intent, even though the way the intent information
is presented in the ATC screen can be improved. Simulation
results have also provided some recommendations that would
be addressed in the reminder of the project. For example, to
extend the preliminary analysis of traffic in order to identify
specific aircraft that may enter in separation conflict with the
RPAS. Then, time the RPAS mission so that the conflict poten-
tially occurs. Another recommendation would be to improve
the ADS-C flight intent communication mechanism to include
in a consistent way the differences between requested intent
and flown intent. Further experiments need to be developed
in order to analyze the impact of the RPAS integration to the
flight efficiency of surrounding traffic.
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